USHABEN vs BHAGYALAXMI CHITRA MANDIR (1978)
AIR 13 Guj 13
Facts
The case of Ushaben v. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir (1978) arose from a dispute over the screening of a controversial film, Jai Santoshi Maa, in a cinema hall. The petitioner, Ushaben, sought a legal injunction to stop the exhibition of the film, arguing that it hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus by depicting Hindu deities in an inappropriate and misleading manner.
Ushaben contended that the portrayal of goddess Santoshi Maa in the movie was offensive and could potentially mislead devotees regarding religious practices and beliefs. She claimed that the screening of the film should be prohibited as it amounted to an infringement on religious sentiments and could lead to public disorder.
The defendants, Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir (a cinema hall), argued that the film had already received certification from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) and that artistic expressions, even if they involved religious themes, were protected under the law. They contended that no individual had the absolute right to prevent the exhibition of a film merely on the ground that it hurt personal religious beliefs.
Issues
Whether the exhibition of the film Jai Santoshi Maa violated religious sentiments and warranted legal prohibition.
Whether religious sentiments could be a ground to restrict the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
Whether an individual or a group could seek legal intervention to ban a film based solely on personal religious beliefs.
Relevant Articles and Provisions
Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution – Protects the right to freedom of speech and expression, including artistic expression through films and media.
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution – Guarantees the right to freedom of religion, subject to public order, morality, and health.
The Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Governs the certification and regulation of films in India, ensuring that films comply with reasonable restrictions.
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) – Prohibits deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings.
Judgment
The Gujarat High Court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the petition, holding that the mere portrayal of religious figures in a film does not necessarily amount to an offense against religious sentiments. The court reasoned that in a secular democracy like India, freedom of speech and expression must be upheld, even if a section of society finds certain content offensive.
The judgment emphasized that religious sentiments alone cannot be a valid ground for restricting the exhibition of a film unless it can be shown that the content is maliciously intended to insult or incite violence. The court found no evidence that Jai Santoshi Maa was made with malicious intent to hurt religious sentiments.
Additionally, the court held that since the film had been approved by the Central Board of Film Certification, it was deemed legally suitable for public viewing. It further observed that artistic and religious interpretations vary, and courts should not intervene in subjective perceptions unless a clear violation of the law is established.
Contemporary Relevance
The ruling in Ushaben v. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir continues to hold relevance in modern debates on artistic freedom, censorship, and the conflict between free speech and religious sentiments. In recent years, similar controversies have arisen over films, books, and artworks that depict religious or cultural themes in ways that some groups find objectionable.
This case reaffirmed that personal religious beliefs cannot dictate public discourse and artistic expression unless the content poses a direct threat to public order. It serves as a precedent in legal battles where demands for censorship clash with constitutional freedoms, ensuring that artistic and creative liberties are protected within reasonable legal boundaries.
The judgment has influenced subsequent rulings on film censorship, hate speech, and freedom of expression, reinforcing the principle that subjective offense alone cannot justify legal prohibition.
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