State of Andhra Pradesh vs R. Punnayya || AIR 1958 SC 465 || Case Summary

Facts

• The deceased, aged 55 years, was attacked with heavy sticks by the accused, in furtherance of a political feud in the village.

• The accused followed the deceased to a neighboring place and attacked him when he got off the bus.

• The attack was on non-vital parts (arms and legs) and resulted in the deceased's death the following morning due to shock.

• The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC, finding the act constituted murder under clause “thirdly” of Section 300.

• The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), citing lack of premeditation and injuries not being on vital parts.

Issues

1. Whether the actions of the accused amounted to murder under Section 300 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.

2. Whether the High Court erred in concluding that the case did not fall under Section 300 (clause “thirdly”).

Key Legal Provisions

1. Section 299 IPC – Definition of culpable homicide. [Section 100 of BNS]

2. Section 300 IPC – Definition of murder, specifically clause “thirdly” (bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death). [Section 101 of BNS]

3. Section 304 IPC – Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. [Section 105 of BNS]

4. Section 34 IPC – Acts done in furtherance of common intention. [Section 3(5) of BNS]

Judgement

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the conviction under Section 302 IPC. The reasoning was as follows:

1. Premeditation and Common Intention:

   • The attack was deliberate and coordinated, as evidenced by the accused chasing the deceased and attacking him in concert.

   • This established common intention under Section 34 IPC.

2. Applicability of Section 300, Clause “Thirdly”:

   • The bodily injuries inflicted, though not on vital parts, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

   • Death resulted from the cumulative effect of shock due to the injuries inflicted, satisfying the criteria of clause “thirdly.”

3. Errors in the High Court's Reasoning:

   • The High Court erroneously focused on the absence of premeditation and injuries to vital parts, which are not prerequisites for murder under clause “thirdly.”

   • The lack of compound fractures or immediate death does not negate the sufficiency of the injuries to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.