PRATIKSH SHARMA
5-Year Integrated Law Course, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi
IInd Year, B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)
INTRODUCTION
The case of Ram Kisto Mandal and Anr. v. Dhankisto Mandal AIR 1969 SC 2041 deals with the significant issues regarding the transfer of raiyati land under Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 3 of 18722. This appeal by special leave was filed for a declaration of title and possession of certain properties of raiyati land of Sonthal Bihar. The case arose after the High Court of Patna set aside a favourable judgement of the lower court trial and district dealing with a matter arising from transactions effected by Nilmoni Dasi. The appellants challenged these transactions as illegal and not supported by legal necessity, as well as not conforming to provisions of the law. The Supreme Court's judgment reaffirmed the trial court's findings, emphasizing the strict legal framework governing such transfers and the protection of reversioners’ rights in property disputes. This case highlights the importance of adhering to established legal principles in matters of property inheritance and transfer.
LEGAL PROVISIONS
In the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 3 of 1872 , Civil Courts cannot hear cases on matters decided by Settlement Courts under these rules, except as allowed by Sections 25A and 28. Decisions from Settlement Courts have the same authority as court decrees. Proprietors (zamindars) may contest the findings of Settlement Officers in courts established
under the Bengal, Agra, and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 . Such suits must be filed within three years from the publication of the record-of-rights or the final Revenue Court order. After three years, no suit can be brought. If a suit finds the Settlement Officer's decision wrong, the record will be amended accordingly. A raiyat cannot transfer rights in their holding (via sale, gift, etc.) unless the right to transfer is recorded in the record-of-rights. A specific exception allows for a lease related to an excise shop for up to one year with permission from the Sub-divisional Officer. Any transfer not complying with these conditions is invalid and will not be recognized by any court. According to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an exchange occurs when two parties
mutually transfer ownership of one item for another. The transfer must follow the legal procedures applicable to sales.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The property was situated in Sonthal Parganas of Bihar, which belonged to Tonu Mandal who died several years ago leaving behind two daughters, Manoda and Nilmoni Dasi. After the death of Tonu Mandal, both the daughters inherited his property as limited owners. A settlement was done by both the daughters, as per settlement Manodo got 10 annas and Nilmoni got 6 annas shares in property. Later Manoda died in the year 1940 and Nilmoni Dasi succeeded to her share. Hence, Nilmoni was the sole limited owner of Tonu Mandal’s entire property. Nilmoni Dasi had four sons, who died during her lifetime. However, she had grandsons (first party defendants in the suit and Schedule D and E property owners at the time of sthe uit).
Nilmoni Dasi executed a sale deed in the year 1314 of Bengali sambat in respect of Schedule C properties in favor of the predecessors-in-title of the defendant third party and these defendants were in possession of Schedule C properties.
In 1295 Bengali Sambat Year , she had also executed a deed of exchange in favor of Premmoyee Dasi under which she exchanged Schedule B properties for Schedule E properties situated in Sokrul village. As per exchange deed, it was recorded under name of
two ladies as raiyats. The descendants of the said Premmoyee Dasi were the defendants of the second party and were in possession of Schedule B properties at the date of the suit.
Tonu mandal had two brothers named , Santusta Mandal and Bhim Mandal. At the time of death of Nilmoni Dasi Plaintiff 2 was the sole surviving descendant of Bhim Mandal. Plaintiff 1 and defendant of fourth party, Kalipada and Gobind were the surviving descendants of the Santusta Mandal. As per the Dayabhaga system of Hindu Inheritance, the two appellants (Plaintiff) and defendants of the fourth party were the nearest heirs of the Tonu Mandal after the death of Nilmoni Dasi and were entitled to succeed to his estate. Gobind Mandal died during the pending of the suit and his son and widow became his legal
representatives.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
District & Trial Court:
The case was that the sale deed in favor of defendants of the third party (Successor of predecessors-in-title & Schedule C property possession) and the deed of exchange in favor of Premmoyee Dase (Schedule B property holder) were not valid and binding on them. The contention of the appellants was that this sale deed and exchange deed was neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate of Tonu Mandal and that defendants of the first party had no right, title or interest to the properties in their possession after the death of Nilmoni Dasi. Defendants contention was that the sale deed and exchange deed were for legal
necessity or for the benefit of the estate and that as they were in possession of the property for a very long time their title has ripened in an event by adverse possession.
The trial court and district court in appeal both found that the Nilmoni Dasi was in possession of Schedule D and E and as the defendants of the first party were in possession on her death, they had no right, title or interest therein and were trespassers. The plea of adverse possession was also got rejected by both the courts on the ground of Article 141 of Limitation Act,1908, This article enables appellants, as reversioners, to file a suit for possession within twelve years after the death of the said Nilmoni Dasi.
The court also found that deed of exchange and sale deed both were neither for legal necessity nor of the benefit of the estate. On the basis of these findings, trial court passed a decree which was confirmed by District Court, in favor of the appellants. They were titled to an 8 annas share in Schedule B, C and D properties and granted joint possession along with
the defendants of the fourth party. As the deed of exchange was not valid and bindings on the appellants, the decedents of Premmoyee Dasi were entitled to fall back upon the Schedule E properties.
High Court of Patna:
After the decision of District and Trial court in favor of Appellants, the defendants appealed in the High Court of Patna under appeal no. 1467 of 1958 and two grandsons of Nilmoni Dasi, Tribhanga Gorain and Pawan Gorain, preferred second appeal no. 1468 of 1958 in the High Court. The High Court dismissed second appeal no. 1468 of 1958 on the basis that it was not entitled to interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by trial court and the District Court. Whereas the appeal no. 1467 of 1958 was heard, the High court overturned the decision of the lower court and set aside the decree in favor of Schedule B property.
The appellants raised two contentions in regard to Schedule B properties:
(1) that the said exchange was neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate of
Tonu Mandal; and
(2) that in any event Section 27 of the said Regulation 3 of 187211
, as it stood at the date of the said transaction, governed Sch. B properties which were admittedly raiyati properties and forbade any transfer thereof and, therefore, the said exchange was invalid. With regard to the first contention, the High Court held that though the exchange could not be said to be for legal necessity, it was for the benefit of the estate. For the second contention, it
disallowed the contention on the ground that it was raised for the first time during the arguments before the High Court and it could not allow it to be raised as it involved an investigation of certain facts namely,
(a) that the respondents could have shown if the contention had been raised earlier that as
provided by Section 27(1) , the record of rights had set out the right of Nilomoni Dasi to
transfer the said lands and that if that were so, Section 27 would not bar transfer of the said
lands, by such a person; and
(b) that the respondents could also have contended that if the said exchange was invalid by
reason of Section 27(1), they held the lands after the said exchange adversely to the
reversioners of Nilmoni Dasi and that they being in possession for more than twelve years
their title was completed by adverse possession.
ISSUES BEFORE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA:
(i) Whether the High Court was right in disallowing the appellants to raise before it the plea
based on Section 27(1) of Regulation 3 of 1872,
(ii) Whether the appellants' claim could be resisted on the ground of adverse possession under
Article 141 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908;
(iii) Whether an exchange of land was transfer within the meaning of Section 27(1) of the
Regulation;
the Regulation.
(iv) Whether the validity of the exchange could not be challenged in view of Section 11 of
JUDGMENT
After overturning the decision of trial and district court by the High Court of Patna, Appellant Ram Kisto Mandal and Anr. appealed in the Supreme Court of India, where Supreme court decided that High Court was not correct in the course of arguments for the contention that the arguments was raised for the first time before it. However, it is clear form judgment of the District Court that the contention based on Section 27 was already raised as this court had made a distinction between lands situate in Sonthal Parganas, that is Schedule B properties and the lands situate in village Birbhum, that is Schedule E properties. It was observed that whereas Section 27 was applied to former , it did not apply to the latter property. Hence, High court was not right in disallowing the said contention on the ground that it was not raised earlier. Section 27 of the Regulation clearly laid down an absolute bar to sales of the rights of a raiyat property and as the Nilmoni Dasi’s Schedule B properties was raiyati property it will also be not registered and recognized as valid by any court under its sub section (2). Therefore, if it assumed that the contention of invalidity of the exchange was raised for the first time, the language of the sub section (2) is clear and High Court had to take notice of such a contention and was bound to hold the exchange invalid if sub section (1) had applied to the transaction. Thus, Section 27 laid down a prohibition against transfer of raiyati land, the burden of proof that the exchange was invalid is no doubt upon the appellants. However, once it is shown that the subject-matter of the exchange of Schedule B properties was raiyati land then it is on respondent to show that the prohibition did not apply by relying upon exception to the rule laid down under Sub-section (1), the burden of provide would shift to the respondent. Hence it was responsibility of the respondent to establish that the record of rights contained an entry to the effect that the transfer in respect of the those lands was legal. Therefore, High Court was not justified in disallowing the contention raised by the appellants either on the ground that it
was raised for the first time before it and respondent could have shown the entry in Record of rights Again,the High Court was not correct in not allowing the contention on the basis of the adverse possession of the exchange. As such plea was raised by respondent in District Court and court rightly rejected as per Article 141 of the Limitation Act, 1908. As the suit has been filed after the two years of death of Nilmoni Dasi the claim to declaration and possession was not barred. A person who has been in adverse possession for twelve years or more of property inherited by a widow from her husband by any act or omission on her part is not entitled on that ground to hold it adversely as against the next reversioners on the death of such a widow. The next reversioners is entitled to recover possession of the property, if it is immovable, within twelve years from the widow's death under Article 141. This rule does not rest entirely on Article 141 but is in accord with the principles of Hindu law and the general principles. The counsel of respondent contended that Section 27 does not in express terms mention an exchange and there the deed of exchange is beyond the scope of that section. However, under Section 118 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transaction is exchange when two persons mutually transfer the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another provided it not an exchange of money only. A transfer of property in completion of an exchange can be made only in the manner provided for; the transfer of such property by sale. Hence, the exchange falls with-in the scope of Section 27. The Supreme Court stated that it is true that Section 27 and 28 of the Regulation were repealed by Sonthal Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 14 of 1949. However at the transaction time it was in force. Hence, at that period of transaction of this property it was invalid and void, so the fact of repealed section make no difference. The next contention was that as per Section 11 of the Regulation, the appellant’s suit was not maintainable as the validity of the said exchange could not be agitated in a court, once the settlement court made an entry. Section 11 lays down that except as provided in Section 25A no suit shall be filed in any civil Court regarding any matter decided by any settlement officer and his decisions and orders regarding the interests and rights above mentioned shall have the force of a decree of a Court. However both the section of the regulation don’t have any application to this section. As the Section 11 is in effect, when a decision of a settlement officer under Regulation has the force of a decree of a civil court and such a decision can only be challenged subsequently in a Court of law to the limited extent provided by Section 25A. However, the question whether the said exchange of Schedule B properties for Schedule E properties was invalid or not by reason of Section 27 was neither agitated before, nor determined by, any settlement officer or Court and, therefore, the bar of Section 11 cannot apply to the present suit. Finally, Supreme Court held that for the aforesaid reasons , the High Court was in error and District Court was correct in holding the appellants being entitled to Schedule B properties and Schedule E properties to successors of Premmoyee Dasi. Therefore Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the decree passed by the trial Court. The respondents was ordered to pay the appellants the costs of this appeal and in the High Court.
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