L. Chandra Kumar vs Union Of India And Others
1997 (3) SCC 261
Case Summary
Administrative Tribunals
BACKGROUND
The concept of tribunals in India was introduced through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976, which added Article 323-A and Article 323-B, allowing Parliament and state legislatures to set up tribunals for resolving service-related and other specialized disputes. This was done to reduce the burden on High Courts and expedite justice.
However, the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, enacted under Article 323-A, contained provisions that excluded the jurisdiction of High Courts over matters decided by these tribunals. This exclusion was upheld in the case of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987), where the Supreme Court initially found that tribunals could replace High Courts as adjudicating bodies.
Over time, concerns arose about the lack of judicial independence, inefficiency, and executive control over tribunals. This led to a fresh constitutional challenge in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, where the petitioner argued that excluding judicial review by High Courts violated the basic structure of the Constitution.
FACTS
The case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India addressed the constitutional validity of Clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A and Clause (3)(d) of Article 323-B of the Indian Constitution. These clauses excluded the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 over matters adjudicated by administrative tribunals. The petitioner contended that such exclusion undermined the basic structure of the Constitution, particularly the principle of judicial review, and questioned whether tribunals could effectively replace High Courts in exercising this function.
RELEVANT ARTICLES
Article 323-A - Provision for administrative tribunals for service matters.
Article 323-B - Provision for tribunals for other matters like taxation, industrial disputes, etc.
Article 226 & 227 - Empower High Courts with the power of judicial review.
Article 32 - Guarantees the right to constitutional remedies through the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
Whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court by Clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A and Clause (3)(d) of Article 323-B is unconstitutional.
Whether administrative tribunals can serve as effective substitutes for High Courts in exercising the power of judicial review.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court held that the power of judicial review is an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be ousted. Consequently, it declared Clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A and Clause (3)(d) of Article 323-B unconstitutional to the extent that they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed that administrative tribunals could function as supplemental forums but not as substitutes for High Courts regarding judicial review. All decisions of tribunals are subject to scrutiny by the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and by the Supreme Court under Article 32. This judgment reinforced the supremacy of the judiciary in upholding constitutional principles and ensuring checks and balances within the framework of the Constitution.
It also held that tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of a statutory provioson are questioned and shall have the power to test the vires of a subordinate legislation and rules, however, they may not entertain any questions regarding the vires of their parent act following the settled principle that a tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Courtmay be approached directly.
CRITICISM
---One of the major criticisms of this judgment is that it overburdened the High Courts instead of easing their workload. The primary objective of establishing administrative tribunals was to provide an alternative forum for speedy dispute resolution. However, by restoring the power of judicial review to the High Courts, the Supreme Court defeated the purpose of the tribunal system. Instead of reducing the backlog of cases, the decision led to an increased number of appeals before the High Courts, making the judicial system even more clogged.
---The ruling also weakened the autonomy and effectiveness of tribunals. The introduction of Articles 323-A and 323-B aimed to establish specialized tribunals with subject-matter expertise. However, by subjecting tribunal decisions to judicial review, the court undermined their independence and reduced their authority, making them function more as subordinate courts rather than independent adjudicatory bodies. This raised concerns about whether tribunals could function efficiently if every decision could ultimately be reviewed by a High Court.
---Another key issue is that the judgment did not completely eliminate executive interference in tribunal appointments. While the court emphasized the need for tribunals to be independent, it did not establish strong safeguards to ensure that the executive does not have excessive control over tribunal members. This lack of concrete guidelines left the tribunal system vulnerable to continued political and bureaucratic influence, which could compromise their impartiality.
---The decision also partially overruled S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, which had recognized tribunals as effective substitutes for High Courts. Instead of striking a balance, L. Chandra Kumar tilted too much in favor of judicial supremacy, without providing a clear framework for how tribunals should function alongside the courts. This created uncertainty about the tribunals' role and authority, as they were now subject to constant judicial scrutiny.
---Furthermore, the judgment did not propose any structural reforms to improve tribunal functioning. Although it recognized the need for tribunals to be composed of legally trained professionals, it failed to provide a concrete mechanism for ensuring this. Without addressing the appointment process, tenure security, and financial independence of tribunals, the ruling left many unresolved issues that continue to affect the efficiency of the system.
--Lastly, the ruling led to delays and inefficiencies in the justice delivery system. Since every decision of a tribunal could now be reviewed by a High Court under Article 226/227, litigation became a multi-stage process, making it more time-consuming. This defeated the very purpose of setting up tribunals in the first place—to provide a faster, more accessible justice mechanism.
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