Khan Gul vs. Lakha Singh
AIR 1928 Lah. 609
Case Summary
FACTS
In this case, the first defendant engaged in negotiations to sell a piece of land to the plaintiff while still minor and deceptively concealing his true age. The amount of Rs. 17,500/- was received as payment, with Rs. 8,000 paid in cash to the Sub-Registrar, and the remaining Rs. 9,500 secured through a promissory note payable on demand.
The plaintiffs contended that the Rs. 17,500 had been lawfully paid to defendant no. 1, as the promissory note of Rs. 9,500 in his favor was discharged by another promissory note issued by the plaintiffs to defendant no. 1's brother-in-law, Muhammad Hussain, as per defendant 1's request. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted having paid Rs. 5,500 of the Rs. 9,500 to Muhammad Hussain and expressed willingness to settle the remaining amount. Despite receiving the payment, defendant no. 1 refused to transfer ownership of the property. The plaintiffs sought either possession of the property sold or a decree for Rs. 17,500, the consideration money, along with interest or damages for breach of contract at a rate of 1% per month, totaling Rs. 1,050. This amounted to a request for a total of Rs. 19,000, which the plaintiffs proposed to be imposed against defendant no. 1's other properties.
ISSUES
Whether a minor who has convinced a person to sign into a contract by fraudulently claiming himself to be a major is barred from arguing his minority to escape the contract?
Whether a party who, as a minor, entered into a contract by making a false representation about his age, whether as a defendant or plaintiff, can decline to fulfill the contract while retaining the advantage he may have gained from it in a future dispute?
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA): In Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh (1928), the court dealt with contract formation and the principle that an offer must be accepted to create a binding contract. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act embodies the principle of estoppel, preventing a party from denying a fact if their actions or statements led another to rely on it. However, in this case, since there was no valid acceptance of the contract, estoppel did not apply, reinforcing that contractual obligations cannot arise from mere expectation or silence.
JUDGEMENT
In the case of Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh, the court rendered a judgment, drawing on the precedent set by the Privy Council’s decision in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose. The pivotal question before the court was whether the doctrine of estoppel could be applied to minors in the context of contracts.The court, considering the historical uncertainty surrounding a minor’s contractual competence, unequivocally asserted that a person legally incompetent due to infancy, as defined in Section 11 of the Contract Act, cannot validly enter into a contract. The court emphasized that the law of estoppel, a universal principle, should not be misapplied to contracts involving minors, as it conflicts with the specific legislative intent to protect minors under Section 11.Analysing the principle of equity, the court observed that while infants are not held accountable under the contract, their fraudulent misrepresentation of age can trigger equitable responsibility. Referring to the Doctrine of Restitution, the court held that, in such cases, parties may be restored to their pre-contractual positions. In light of these considerations, the court in Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh concluded that applying the doctrine of estoppel to minors would result in absurdity and injustice. Citing Jenning v. Rundall, the court emphasized the protective nature of laws for minors, wielding them as shields rather than swords. The judgment, aligned with the principles laid out in Mohori Bibee, underscored the restoration of both parties to their original status before the contract, ensuring fairness and justice in the absence of a valid contract.
-Kush Kuthiala
Himachal Pradesh National Law University.
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