Bhikaji Narain Dhakras vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.
1955 AIR 781
Case Summary
(Doctrine of Eclipse)
FACTS:
C.P Transport Services and Provincial Transport Company Ltd. Are key private transport companies in Madhya Pradesh, collectively holding over 85% of the market share. This dominant position gives the government significant influence over the region’s transport sector. The companies have challenged the constitutionality of the C.P and Berar Act, 1947, filing five writ petitions under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of the C.P and Berar Act, 1947, these companies were granted permits to operate under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. They argue that the implementation of the C.P and Berar Act would impinge upon the fundamental rights of citizens employed in the transport sector. It would also grant the State extensive powers to regulate the business, potentially disrupting the existing operations.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS:
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution– Right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution– Guarantees the right to practice any profession, trade, or business.
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution – Ensures equality before the law and prohibits arbitrary or discriminatory actions by the state.
Article 19(1)(f) of the Indian Constitution– Protects the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property.
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – The law under which the private transport companies were operating prior to the enactment of the C.P. and Berar Act, 1947.
C.P. and Berar Act, 1947 – The state law regulating road transport in Madhya Pradesh, which the petitioners challenged for limiting their business operations.
Article 301 of the Indian Constitution– Guarantees the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout India, without restrictions.
Article 304(b) of the Indian Constitution – Allows the imposition of reasonable restrictions on trade and commerce by a state in the public interest.
ISSUES RAISED:
The constitutionality of the C.P and Berar Amendment Act, 1947, which amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Whether the Act infringes upon Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
Whether the Act violates Article 31 of the Constitution, which deals with the right to property.
Whether laws existing before the Constitution are subject to judicial review under Article 13.
Whether the State’s imposition of monopoly and prohibition falls within the reasonable restrictions allowed under Article 19(6).
Whether the effects of the Constitutional Amendments are retrospective or prospective in nature.
JUDGEMENT:
The court held in Bhikaji vs State of MP that the case of Shagir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Others had no application and the contentions put forward by the respondents were well-founded and must be accepted.
It was clarified that the word ‘void’ in Article 13 means void to the extent of inconsistency with a fundamental right and the entire operation of an inconsistent Act is not nullified. Such Acts apply to past transactions and the rights and liabilities arising from them, even after the commencement of the Constitution, applying to non-citizens as well.
Referring to Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [1961] S.C.R. 288, the court emphasised that the true effect of Article 13(1) is to render an Act inconsistent with a fundamental right inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.
The Impugned Act, no longer inconsistent with the amended clause (6) of Article 19 due to the First Amendment Act, began to operate again from the date of the amendment. However, unlike the expressly retrospective amended clause (2) of Article 19, no rights or obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act from the commencement of the Constitution until the date of the amendment.
The court in Bhikaji v State of MP distinguished and held inapplicable the cases of Shagir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Others, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 and Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 613. It also found American authorities inapplicable.
Furthermore, the impugned Act, on the grounds of Article 31(2), could no longer be considered to infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners, as it had been amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of 1956, which came into force on April 27, 1955. Since these petitions were filed after this date, the petitioners could not challenge the validity of the impugned Act on that ground.
It was also noted that before the advent of the Constitution, it was not clear that the impugned Act was in conflict with section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
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